- Akbayan v. Commission on Elections
- G.R. Nos. 147066 & 147179
- BUENA, J :
- Decision Date
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001.
AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001.
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J p:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions before us is the exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less than by the fundamental law the right of suffrage. DCcTHa
Invoking this right, herein petitioners representing the youth sector seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline.
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
"Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People's Participation presided over by the Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request by youth organizations to hold additional two days of registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration under
"To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for 'hakot system,' certain restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as safeguards against fraudulent applicants:
"1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
"2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and
"3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records.
"Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
"1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the actual registration of the applicants;
"2. The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters enumerator's list or conduct ocular inspection;
"3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
"4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest conduct of the registration and drum up interest to register among the new voters.
"The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the country among our youth. Considering that they failed to register on December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for special registration days.
"In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
"The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical side and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED."
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001." EAIcCS
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students' request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at the soonest possible time "in order to accommodate the disenfranchised voters for purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections."
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement of around four (4) million Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in ourSection 1, Article V of the
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of EIAScH
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations bear great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 of
"SECTION 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election." (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of
"SECTION 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. Any registered voter, representative of a political party . . . may file . . . except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election . . . ."
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
". . . The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
"In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list since we would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voter's list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
". . . It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take them at face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter's list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts . . . .
". . . The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be qualified to vote. . . . the very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results. . . ."
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29, and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of thus:
"SECTION 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts. If it should no longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage."
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of
"a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board;"
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of DCASEc
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of the amended act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of vis- -vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC which is the constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the of conducting a special registration, which in its on language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission."
"xxx xxx xxx.
"19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in the park for the Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission has yet to do, and the time to do it in:
"20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The Projects of Precincts indicate the total number of established precincts and the number of registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts, we won't know how many forms to print and so we're liable to come up short.
"21) More importantly, without a completed Projectof Precincts, it will be impossible to complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the elections.
"22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the 4th of March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI including the precinct where they are assigned and the barangay where that precinct is located must be furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not later than the 26th of March.
"23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration Records of registered voters in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified, and sealed beginning March 30, until April 15.
"24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and printed out of use on election day; and finally
"25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the Voters Information Sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
"26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the Comelec will have roughly a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind setting the 120-day prohibitive period. After all, preparing for an election is no easy task.
"27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being illegal, whittle that approximately 30-day margin away to nothing. ETAICc
"28) When we say registration of voters, we do not contrary to popular opinion refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down. Registration is, in fact, a long process that takes about three weeks to complete, not even counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in the first place.
"29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the Comelec, the other Commissioners, prepared a timele in order to see exactly how the superimposition of special registration would affect the on-going preparation for the May 14 elections.
"30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special registration on April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it would take about 14 days if we were to declare special registrations today to print up the difference and to verify these accountable forms. After printing and verification, the forms would have to be packed and shipped roughly taking up a further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
"31) The first step in registration is, of course, filing the application for registration with the Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of and the 17th the posting requirement would be completed by the 24th. Considering that time must be allowed for the filing of oppositions, the earliest that the Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing would be the May 1st and 2nd.
"32) Assuming and this is a big assumption that there are nit challenges to the applicant's right to register, the Election registration Board can immediately rule on the Applicant's registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the 7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by the Board will have already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of registered political parties.
"33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once again focus on the business of getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters' List generated at the earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, if we were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new CVL would be improper since the
"34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book of Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May 14, election date, and still not have finished our election preparations.
"35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots, Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different municipalities. All told, this process would take approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
"36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections. TAEcSC
"xxx xxx xxx."
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished. Incidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001 the day before the prohibitive 120-day period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the Firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter Section 8 of In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
As to petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus. IHTaCE
In , we enunciated that the Court's function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error."
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued was filed before the Senate, with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections. This Court views the foregoing factual circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are hereby DENIED.
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Pardo in his dissenting opinion.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the majority opinion as well as in the Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan.
Melo, J., I also join Justice Kapunan's concurring opinion.
Puno, J., is on official business abroad.
Vitug, J., I join Justice Pardo in his dissent.
Kapunan, J., see concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in the majority opinion of Buena, J. and join in the concurring opinion of Kapunan, J.
Panganiban, J., I join Justice Pardo's Dissent.
Quisumbing, J., I join in the Dissent of J. Pardo.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of J. B. Pardo.
PARDO, J., dissenting:
These are petitions for: (1) certiorari and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction filed by petitioners AKBAYAN Youth, et al.; and (2) mandamus filed by Michelle D. Betito, which seek a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside writ of mandamus directing Comelec to conduct a registration of new voters before the May 14, 2001, national and local elections.
The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 3584, adopted on February 8, 2001, reads as follows:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001."
"System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during the regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."
The backdrop of these petitions is the enactment on June 11, 1996, of which provides for a general registration of voters on June 14, 15, 21 and 22, 1997, and subject to the discretion of the Commission on Elections, on June 28 and 29, 1997 and a system of continuing registration of voters in which a qualified voter shall personally accomplish an application form for registration before the Election Officer on any date during regular office hours. No registration, however, shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
"Pursuant to the powers vested in it by the
On January 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People's Participation, presided over by Senator Raul S. Roco, held a meeting with representatives of the Comelec relative to the request of representatives of the youth for extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to do so before the deadline on December 27, 2000. As a result of the recommendation of Comelec's representatives during the meeting, on February 8, 2001, the Comelec adopted Resolution No. 3584, which denied the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
Subsequently, there has been a nationwide public clamor for additional days for registration of new voters representing the youth sector. SEIacA
Hence, these petitions.
Akbayan-Youth's petition is founded on one of the most fundamental political rights of a Filipino under the
Akbayan-Youth anchors its petition on the following grounds:
Petitioners have all the qualifications to register as voters and exercise their right of suffrage in the May 14, 2001 general elections.
Respondent COMELEC's failure to conduct a thorough, comprehensive, widespread and active nationwide campaign to inform new voters of the registration period legislated in Section 8 of
In any event, Section 8 of
The issues raised are whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion ousting itself of jurisdiction, first, in ruling that the deadline for registration of voters was on December 27, 2000, and failing to give adequate publicity for the dissemination of this deadline and, second, in denying the petition of the "youth" or of those who were unable to register before the deadline to be given a special time to register even after such deadline in time to vote in the elections scheduled on May 14, 2001.
We find the petitions impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage is a constitutional right of the Filipino people to enable them to vote for the leaders who will lead the country. The right to vote is a political right enabling the people to participate in the governance of the State to ensure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed. The people's sovereign authority is exercised through the ballots of qualified voters who would choose their representatives in the governance of the State. For this reason, the
"SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
"SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
"The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Section 1 provides for the requirements to qualify an individual to exercise the right to vote for a candidate in an election which is achieved through registration. Registration of voters is a pre-election activity necessary and essential to determine who are the qualified voters. A person may possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, but can not vote for the reason that he is not registered. Non-registration will render nugatory the constitutional right of suffrage granted to every qualified Filipino citizen. This in the main is the essence of these petitions.
Since the Constitutional provision on suffrage is not self-executing, Congress enacted several laws implementing the same. The basic election law is or " DcCASI
Relative to the issues raised, Section 29 of
"SECTION 29. Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts. If it should no longer be reasonably possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage."
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that laws are to be harmonized rather than consider one repealed in favor of the other. Besides, there is nothing incongruous in "The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal."
In the same fashion, Relampagos v. Cumba, we ruled that "By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. . . . This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the
This should be construed as a Congressional intention to retain the "standby power" of the Commission to fix periods for pre-election activities given even under The law empowered the Secretary of the Interior (predecessor of Comelec in the execution of election laws), if, on account of insurmountable difficulties, the registration of voters could not be effected on the dates fixed therein, the Secretary of the Interior may, with the approval of the President, fix another date so that the omission may be remedied and the voters may not be deprived of the right of suffrage.
In the Revised In P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 "fix other periods for certain pre-election requirements in order that voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage." Congress reiterated this power of the Comelec in
Both cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. The
Under the circumstances prevailing, the prohibition to conduct registration one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election as set forth in The Comelec erroneously perceived that the number of voters who registered during the system of continuing registration is the barometer for the success or effectiveness of their information campaign which was actually non-existent. Comelec must bear the responsibility for this. Time and again, it has been said that every Filipino's right to vote shall be respected and upheld. Preliminary as it is in the exercise of their right to vote, the deprivation of their right to register is tantamount to the denial of their right to vote.
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of thethe conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes."
In fact, the Comelec has actually misled the public by its erroneous resolution declaring that the last day for registration under the system of continuing registration was on December 27, 2000. Counting the 120 days from May 14, 2001, the date of the regular election, the last day fell on January 14, 2001. Truly, the last day for the registration of voters was on January 14, 2001, not December 27, 2000. This fact had undoubtedly disenfranchised voters and deprived qualified voters of their right to suffrage in the forthcoming elections. This "error" of respondent Comelec not only affected petitioners, representatives of the Filipino youth, but also thousands or perhaps millions of other qualified Filipino voters who failed to register within that erroneous deadline. Equally important, Comelec's resolution pre-terminating the deadline of registration under the system of continuing registration deprived the Filipino voters not only of their right to register but also to transfer their registration to their present residence.
The legal and operational problems which respondent Comelec claim they would encounter with the holding of a special registration as well as the effect on its preparation for the May 14, 2001 elections, are matters that can be solved with proper planning, coordination and cooperation among its Members, staff and other deputized agencies of the government. Extraordinary efforts may be needed, but the work can still be done. HaTSDA
It bears stressing that Comelec has vast powers. "Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the
The powers and functions of the Comelec conferred upon it by the
The quasi-judicial power of the Commission embraces the power to resolve controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the
It is reasonably expected that Comelec under its new leadership will take appropriate action in order not to deprive those who are qualified to vote by the neglect, inaction or delay in its preparations for the coming election.
On the matter of the exclusion/inclusion of voters as prescribed in and the courts may resolve the applications in time to be received by the election officers or the board of election inspectors concerned not later thirty (30) days before the May 14, 2001 elections, to enable respondent Comelec to prepare the necessary list of voters. Comelec retains residual powers to adopt adequate safeguards to ensure that "flying" voters and other ineligible or disqualified voters are not able to register or transfer their registration.
WHEREFORE, I vote to annul and set aside Comelec Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001 as well as Resolution No. 3258, dated September 28, 2000, insofar as it fixed the deadline for registration on December 27, 2000.
KAPUNAN, J ., concurring opinion:
I respectfully submit that respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001, denying the request to conduct a special registration of voters less than one hundred twenty (120) days before the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
The right of suffrage is enshrined in the
entitled "An Act It was adopted precisely "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters." The certified list of voters then existing under To replace the cancelled list,
SECTION 7. General Registration of Voters. Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and subject to the discretion of the Commission on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
SECTION 8. System of Continuing registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
In support of their petitions, petitioners argue that the COMELEC possesses a "standby power" under Section 29 of ( ( LexLib
The "standby power" of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration under Section 29 of registration of voters was held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election. It was in recognition of the insufficiency of the two-day registration period under Section 126 that Section 29 of
There is clearly no reason for the use of the "standby power" under Section 29 of
Moreover, Section 29 of Where a conflict between a general law and a special statute exists, the latter should prevail because it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general law. The special law is to be construed as an exception to the general law in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. Applying the foregoing rule to the cases at bar, since Section 29 of , and
To my mind, the provision that no registration shall be conducted within 120 days prior to regular elections is clear and unequivocal. The reasons therefor are readily apparent. The 120-day prohibition was designed to allow the COMELEC to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections, including, among others: (1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) The said prohibition should be likewise viewed in conjunction with Section 35 of the same law on the prohibition against the filing of petitioners for exclusion within one hundred (100) days prior to regular elections. As pointed out by the COMELEC, petitions for exclusion are necessary mechanisms to ensure that the voters lists are free from "flying voters," "ghost voters," unqualified registrants and the like. If a "special" registration is conducted within the prohibited period, without providing for an extension of time for the filing of exclusion petitions, then the integrity of the Voters List and the entire election process might be seriously compromised. Indeed, to allow the conduct of registration at this very late hour, less than 50 days from the election, is patently against the letter and spirit of
Considering the express prohibition under Section 8 of
To order the COMELEC to conduct a special registration would, moreover, compel it to disregard certain provisions prohibiting specific pre-election acts. Section 34 of
SECTION 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list of voters in his precinct at any time except one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a special election. . . .
Section 35 of the same Act prohibits the filing of a petition for exclusion of voters from the permanent list, thus:
SECTION 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. Any registered voter, representative of any political party of the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address and the precinct of the challenged voter at anytime except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days before a special election. . . . DTEcSa
The Commission is also prevented from executing any order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters within ninety (90) days before an election under Section 39,
SECTION 39. Annulment of Book of Voters. The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter of election officer of duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act or was prepared through fraud; bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within ninety (90) days before an election.
Violation of any of these provisions is deemed an election offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) to six (6) years without probation, disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.
SECTION 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act.
a) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 46. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any Election offense under this Act shall be punished an imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the present term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.)
These penal provisions underscore the prohibitive feature of the foregoing provisions as well as that prescribing the 120-day period against registration.
Indubitably, mandamus would not lie since petitioners have not shown a duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration. On the contrary, the issuance of the writ would force COMELEC to perform an act prohibited and punished by law.
The Solicitor General makes much ado over the issuance by the COMELEC of Resolution No. 3258, dated September 28, 2000, prescribing December 27, 2000 as the last day of filing applications for registration. He points out that the 120-day prohibited period, counted from May 14, 2001, began on January 14, 2001. Hence, prospective applicants had until January 13, 2001 and not December 27, 2000 to apply for registration. "Effectively," the Solicitor General argues, "unregistered but otherwise qualified voters were deprived by respondent COMELEC of eleven (11) working days within which to register." Petitioners and the Solicitor General also fault the COMELEC for failing to engage in sufficiently disseminating information to the public regarding the December 27, 2000 deadline.
It is an overstatement to say, as petitioners and the Solicitor General do, that the reason for the "disenfranchisement of four million new Filipino voters" a figure not duly established was the alleged absence of a massive and active information campaign by the COMELEC for new voters to register.
On the argument that the COMELEC advanced the deadline for registration, it should be noted that the COMELEC resolution setting the time limit was adopted on December 28, 2000; hence, those who turned 18 between December 27, 2000 and January 13, 2001 should have been forewarned to register on or before the deadline or asked for extension of up to January 13, 2001. There is no showing that anybody had done so. The advancing of the deadline for a few days is not as serious an infraction as petitioners would portray.
Granting arguendo that COMELEC has the "standby power" to order a special registration during the prohibited period, the Court cannot compel to compel the COMELEC to conduct the same given its admission that it is already operationally impossible to undertake said activity at this point in time. In its Comment, the COMELEC outlined its calendar of activities for the election on May 14, 2001, and showed, in the process, why the conduct of a special registration is no longer practicable. The Court should seriously take these objective facts into consideration. After all, it is the COMELEC which is solely tasked by the and to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections."
The functions of the COMELEC under the It is elementary in administrative law that "courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." The reason behind this salutary policy has been explained in this manner:
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to contemporaneous construction because of the respect due the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. (Citations omitted) HEDaTA
The determination of the feasibility of conducting a special registration less than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election "must be dealt with realistically and not from the standpoint of pure theory." The COMELEC, not this Court, is concededly in a better position to resolve this matter considering its actual experience as well as its knowledge of its own operational and logistical capabilities. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. Since it is the COMELEC's honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake the conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the entire election process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative "finding of fact."
The marked trend in our laws and jurisprudence has been to grant the COMELEC ample latitude in order that it can more effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, the Court enunciated that the primordial objective of the COMELEC is to "promote free, orderly, and honest elections:"
The purpose of the Revised
This pronouncement was reiterated in Loong vs. COMELEC. Due regard for the independent character of the COMELEC, as ordained by the compel that body to perform an act that would imperil the holding of a "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible" election on May 14, 2001. This Court's function is merely to check and not to supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the limits prescribed by law, not to exercise the power vested in it or to determine the wisdom of its act. Clearly, certiorari would not lie.
A final word. Petitioners must remember that while the right of suffrage is constitutionally guaranteed, this is no reason for them to be complacent in the performance of their corresponding duties as potential voters and excuse them from complying with the requirements laid down by law. aESHDA
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the instant petition.
1. G.R. No. 147066 and G.R. No. 147179.
3. Letter of Senator Raul Roco.
4. G.R. No. 147066, Rollo, p. 24.
5. See Resolution No. 3584.
6. Resolution dated March 13, 2001.
9. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 265-266, Fourth Edition, 1998; , 7 SCRA 670 (1963); , 7 SCRA 872 (1963).
10. Agpalo, Ibid., p. 271; , 71 SCRA 176 (1976).
11. Ibid., p. 271; , 167 SCRA 51 (1988).
12. Comment of respondent COMELEC, p. 14.
13. Ibid., p. 9.
14. G.R. No. 147179, Rollo, pp. 98-102.
15. , 104 Phil. 889 (1958).
16. , 147 SCRA 447 (1987).
17. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 157-158, Fourth Edition, 1998.
18. Paragraphs 4 and 5 in G.R. No. 147066 and Paragraph 9 in G.R. No. 147179.
19. , 289 SCRA 159 (1998); , G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000 citing , 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
20. Article IX-C, Section 2.
21. , 7 SCRA 797 1963; , 18 SCRA 8 1966.
22. G.R. No. 138570, promulgated on October 10, 2000.
23. , 199 SCRA 692 (1991); , 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); , 42 SCRA 480-481 (1971).
24. An Act Providing for the Conduct of Special Registration of Voters before the May 14, 2001, National and Local Elections.
PARDO, J ., dissenting:
1. An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds, therefor.
2. Section 7,
Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22, and, subject to the discretion of the Commission, on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
5. G.R. No. 147066, filed on March 5, 2001, G.R. No. 147179, filed on March 9, 2001. On March 13, 2001, we resolved to consolidate these cases, and required respondents to file comment not later than 10:00 a.m., March 16, 2001, and to set the cases for hearing at 3:00 p.m. Respondents filed their comment on March 16, 2001, at 11:20 a.m.
6. G.R. No. 147066.
7. Petition, G.R. No. 147066, pp. 6-7.
* These provisions were also present in the previous
9. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (Third Edition) 1995, p. 322, citing Valdez v. Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943 1920, and other cases.
10. Ibid., citing Iloilo Palay & . Planters Assn., Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
11. 243 SCRA 690, 703 1995.
12. An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Authorized Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.
13. Com. Act No. 357, Sec. 96.
14. Com. Act No. 357, Sec. 6.
15. R.A. No. 180, Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 101.
16. P.D. No. 1296, the 1978
17. In fairness to Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo, this occurred before his appointment to the position of Chairman on February 16, 2001.
18. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 129 Phil. 7, 33 1967; Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512, 519 1991.
19. Taule v. Santos, supra, Note 18.
20. Taule v. Santos, supra, Note 18, p. 519, citing Hontiveros v. Altavos, 24 Phil. 636 1913.
21. Taule v. Santos, supra, Note 14, p. 519, citing Javier v. Commission on Elections, 228 Phil. 193, 205 1986.
22. Loong v. Commission on Elections, 305 SCRA 832, 866-867 1999.
23. Digman v. Comelec, 120 SCRA 650 1983.
KAPUNAN, J ., concurring opinion:
1. An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, adopting A System of Continuing Registration, prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds, Therefor.
2. The law took effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation.
3. Section 2,
4. Section 7, id.
7. The provision reads:
Sec. 126. Registration of voters. On the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election or on the second Saturday following the day of the proclamation calling for a new special election, plebiscite or referendum, any person desiring to be registered as a voter shall accomplish in triplicate before the board of election inspectors a voter's affidavit in which shall be stated the following data:
(a) Name, surname, middle name, maternal surname;
(b) Date and place of birth;
(d) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
(e) Exact address with the name of the street and house number or in case there is none, a brief description of the locality and the place;
(f) a statement that the applicant has not been previously registered, otherwise, he shall be required to attach a sworn application for cancellation of his previous registration; and
(g) Such other information or data which may be required by the Commission.
The voter's affidavit shall also contain three specimens of the applicant's signature and clear and legible prints of his left and right hand thumbmarks and shall be sworn to and filed together with four copies of the latest identification photograph to be supplied by the applicant.
The oath of the applicant shall include a statement that he has does not have any of the disqualifications of a voter and that he has not been previously registered in the precinct or in any other precinct.
Before the applicant accomplishes his voter's affidavit, the board of election inspectors shall appraise the applicant of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter. It shall also see to it that the accomplished voter's affidavit contain all the data therein required and that the applicant's specimen signatures, the prints of his left and right thumbmarks and his photograph are properly affixed in each of the voter's affidavit. (Emphasis supplied.)
8. See Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56-57 (1995); Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294 (1988); Garcia vs. Pascual, 113 Phil. 632, 635 (1932).
9. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 57 (1995).
10. These would include: (1) preparation and posting of the Certified List of Voters [Sec. 30,
11. Comment of Respondent Commission on Elections, pp. 10-11.
12. Section 2(1), Article IX.
13. Section 2(3), Article IX.
14. Ututalam vs. COMELEC, 15 SCRA 465, 469 (1965).
15. Melendres vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262, 275 (1999) citing First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, 253 SCRA 552 (1996).
16. Nestle Phil., Inc. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 504, 510-511 (1991).
17. In Sumulong vs. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1994), the Court made the following pronouncement:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so this court may also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not fully agree with its choice of means but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derive from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. (Underscoring ours)
19. 19 SCRA 911 (1967).
20. Id., at 921-922.
21. 305 SCRA 832 (1999).
22. See Note 17.
23. See Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).