EN BANC

G.R. No. 133132. January 25, 2000.

ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A. PUREZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL L. ADIONG, ROMEO L. CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL, respondents.

Go & Castro Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The present case posed the issue of the constitutionality of

According to the Supreme Court, the petitioners herein were members of the civil service and as such they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided by law. The Supreme Court granted the petition, but only to the extent of declaring Section 8 of

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; CREATION AND ABOLITION OF PUBLIC OFFICE; REQUISITES. The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.

2. ID.; ID.; ABOLITION OF OFFICE; EFFECT THEREOF CONSTRUED. An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents vs. Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991), the Court said: It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure. [De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)] However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. [Jose L. Guerrero vs. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)] We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cesar Z. Dario vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison 176 SCRA 84 (1989) that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent. The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same. . . . This was also the Court's ruling in Guerrero vs. Arizabal, 186 SCRA 108 (1990), wherein it was declared that the substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorganization. ITCcAD

3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONTROL; CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office has been created.

4. ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION; CONSTRUED; REQUISITES. Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in : . . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGULAR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE; WHEN ILLEGALLY DISMISSED SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS NOT HAVING LEFT HIS OFFICE; EFFECT THEREOF. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J p:

The central issue posed before this Court in the present case is the constitutionality of by virtue of which petitioners herein, who were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office. Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. cdtai

The NAPOLCOM was originally created under

On March 6, 1998, Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, who were appointed by President Estrada on June 30, 1998 and who took their oaths of office on July 2, 1998.

According to petitioners, Sections 4 and 8 of

SEC. 13. Creation and Composition. A National Police Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the functions prescribed in theex-officio member. Three (3) of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, one (1) of whom shall be designated as vice chairperson by the President. The fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired: Provided, That an active member of a law enforcement agency shall be considered resigned from said agency once appointed to the Commission: Provided further, That at least one (1) of the Commissioners shall be a woman. The Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-officio Chairperson of the Commission, while the Vice Chairperson shall act as the executive officer of the Commission. cdphil

Meanwhile, Section 8 states that

Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for current Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President for a maximum term of two (2) years.

Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of Section 8 of

It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to ". . . reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."

Public respondents insist that the express declaration in Section 8 of bona fide reorganization. In support of their theory, public respondents cite the various changes introduced by

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in we said:

It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure. [De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)] However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. [Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)] We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cesar Z. Dario vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison 176 SCRA 84 (1989) that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.

The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same . . . . (italics supplied) cdll

This was also our ruling in , wherein we declared that the substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.

We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress. More specifically, whether the changes effected by is squarely in point.

In that case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of insofar as it declared vacant the positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission and provided for the removal of the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. The Court held that the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old law and the new law. Thus:

Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments.

This is precisely what bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

Under (Department) whereas under Contrary to what public respondents would have us believe, this does not result in the creation of an entirely new office. In Mayor, the NLRC, prior to the passage of the amendatory law, was also considered an integral part of the Department of Labor and Employment.

Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM's composition. ex-officio member. In addition, the new law provided that three of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired. Furthermore, it is required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman. Again, as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in Section 20 of remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated by the President.

Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. Under

(a) Exercise administrative control over the Philippine National Police; Cdpr

(b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration;

(c) Foster and develop policies and promulgate rules and regulations, standards and procedures to improve police services based on sound professional concepts and principles;

(d) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities, and facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;

(e) Prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and operation, including recruitment, selection, promotion and retirement;

(f) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;

(g) Conduct surveys and compile statistical data for the proper evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;

(h) Render to the President and to Congress an annual report on its activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendation for appropriate remedial legislation; prcd

(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;

(j) Affirm reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;

(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;

(l) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention;

(m) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and, after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of ranks, awards and medals of honor;

(n) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection therewith; and

(o) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as the President may direct.

Meanwhile, the NAPOLCOM's functions under Section 5 of

a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:

1) Develop policies and promulgate a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and operation, including criteria for manpower allocation, distribution and deployment, recruitment, selection, promotion, and retirement of personnel and the conduct of qualifying entrance and promotional examinations for uniformed members; LLphil

2) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities and facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;

3) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;

4) Conduct an annual self-report survey and compile statistical date for the accurate assessment of the crime situation and the proper evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;

5) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;

6) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;

7) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;

8) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of ranks, awards, and medals of honor. Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the standards of the uniformed personnel of the PNP must be revised which should be clearly distinct from the military and reflective of the civilian character of the police;

9) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection therewith;

10) Inspect and assess the compliance of the PNP on the established criteria for manpower allocation, distribution, and deployment and their impact on the community and the crime situation, and therewith formulate appropriate guidelines for maximization of resources and effective utilization of the PNP personnel; LLphil

11) Monitor the performance of the local chief executives as deputies of the Commission; and

12) Monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities.

b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration;

c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendations for appropriate remedial legislation;

d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention program; and

e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as the President may direct."

Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.

Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under This contention is bereft of merit. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter." On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office has been created.

Public respondents would have this Court believe that

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in .

. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization.

No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress,

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.

At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30, 1998, Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to Sections 40 and 41 of LexLib

Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of section 6 of Article XVI of theThey claim that it amounts to class legislation and amounts to an undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as provided under Section 16 of Article VII of the

In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners' removal from office by virtue of Section 8 of

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring Section 8 of

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Entitled "

2. Rollo, 81.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 83.

5.

6. Id., Art. 9 (B), Sec. 2 (3).

7. , 87 Phil. 289 (1950).

8. Rollo, 84-94.

9. , 243 SCRA 196 (1995).

10. , 94 Phil. 903 (1954).

11. , 158 SCRA 1 (1988); , 129 SCRA 184 (1984).

12. , 116 SCRA 468 (1982).

13. , 78 SCRA 354 (1977).

14. , 93 Phil. 786 (1953).

15. 200 SCRA 685 (1991). See ., 103 Phil. 837 (1958); , 94 Phil. 732 (1954).

16. 186 SCRA 108 (1990).

17. 194 SCRA 672 (1991).

18. Entitled "

Took effect on March 21, 1989.

19. Id. SEC. 35 provides

Equity of the Incumbent. Incumbent career officials and rank-and-file employees of the National Labor Relations Commission not otherwise affected by the Act shall continue to hold office without need of reappointment. However, consistent with the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments, all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commission are hereby declared vacant. However, subject officials shall continue to temporarily discharge their duties and functions until their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified. (italics supplied)

20.

21.

22. Id.

23. Id., SEC. 10. Section 20 of

"SEC. 20. Organizational Structure. The Commission shall consist of the following units:

"(a) Commission Proper. This is composed of the offices of the Chairman and four (4) Commissioners.

"(b) Staff Services. The staff services of the Commission shall be as follows:

"(1) The Planning and Research Service, which shall provide technical services to the Commission in areas of overall policy formulation, strategic and operational planning, management systems or procedures, evaluation and monitoring of the Commission's programs, projects and internal operations; and shall conduct thorough research and analysis on social and economic conditions affecting peace and order in the country;

"(2) The Legal Affairs Service, which shall provide the Commission with efficient service as legal counsel of the Commission; draft or study contracts affecting the Commission and submit appropriate recommendations pertaining thereto; and render legal opinions arising from the administration and operation of the Philippine National Police and the Commission;

"(3) The Crime Prevention and Coordination Service, which shall undertake criminological researches and studies; formulate a national crime prevention plan; develop a crime prevention and information program and provide editorial direction for all criminology research and crime prevention publications;

"(4) The Personnel and Administrative Service, which shall perform personnel functions for the Commission, administer the entrance and promotional examinations for policemen, provide the necessary services relating to records, correspondence, supplies, property and equipment, security and general services, and the maintenance and utilization of facilities, and provide services relating to manpower, career planning and development, personnel transactions and employee welfare;

"(5) The Inspection, Monitoring and Investigation Service, which shall conduct continuous inspection and management audit of personnel, facilities and operations at all levels of command of the PNP, monitor the implementation of the Commission's programs and projects relative to law enforcement; and monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities;

"(6) The Installations and Logistics Service, which shall review the Commission's plans and programs and formulate policies and procedures regarding acquisition, inventory, control, distribution, maintenance and disposal of supplies and shall oversee the implementation of programs on transportation facilities and installations and the procurement and maintenance of supplies and equipment; and

"(7) The Financial Service, which shall provide the Commission with staff advice and assistance on budgetary and financial matters, including the overseeing of the processing and disbursement of funds pertaining to the scholarship program and surviving children of deceased and/or permanently incapacitated PNP personnel.

"(c) Disciplinary Appellate Boards. The Commission shall establish a formal administrative disciplinary appellate machinery consisting of the National Appellate Board and the regional appellate boards.

"The National Appellate Board shall decide cases on appeal from decisions rendered by the PNP chief, while the regional appellate boards shall decide cases on appeal from decisions rendered by officers other than the PNP chief, the mayor, and the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) created hereunder."

(amendments are italicized)

24.

25. Rollo, 88.

26. , 295 SCRA 366 (1998).

27. , G.R. No. L-31641, October 23, 1981.

28. De Leon and De Leon, Jr., The Law On Public Officers And Election Law (1994 ed.), 365.

29. , 176 SCRA 84 (1989).

30. 176 SCRA 84 (1989). See , 211 SCRA 88 (1992); , 207 SCRA 766 (1992); , 202 SCRA 772 (1991).

31. Authority of the Commission to Reorganize the PNP.

Notwithstanding the provisions of

The PNP reorganization program shall be approved by Congress through a joint resolution.

32. , 182 SCRA 692 (1990); , 13 SCRA 566 (1965).

33. Rollo, 8-12.

34. , 288 SCRA 447 (1998).

35. , 186 SCRA 108 (1990).