THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000.

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT- QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.

Sedillo, Icao, Hernando and Associates for petitioners.

Public Attorney's Office for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision and the March 19, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the Trial Court denying petitioners' Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to complete the presentation of their evidence. In dismissing petitioners' appeal, the CA ruled that in giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they actually deserved. cEHSIC

The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their presentation of evidence. Petitioners' lawyer started presenting evidence on April 12, 1993, months after respondents rested their case. The case dragged on for three years with petitioners' counsel presenting only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motion for Postponement. When they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along. Postponement is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS; ATTORNEYS SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTION THAT WOULD UNDULY DELAY A CASE, IMPEDE THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT OR MISUSE COURT PROCESSES. The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure. The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refuse to go along. True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was submitted for decision three times on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February 27, 1995 but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in court each time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this case. Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty. Roque Bongaciso because of the latter's prior commitments which conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on file. He should just have adjusted the order of presentation of witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date in his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bongaciso three years. IHDCcT

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities given them to ventilate their claims, they can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision and the March 19, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court, which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to complete the presentation of their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."

The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision.

The Facts

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao all surnamed Quilat-Quilat filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean all surnamed Edrial and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. The Court of Appeals presented the facts of this case as follows:

"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who was also an election registrar of the COMELEC, filed the complaint in 1975;

Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:

July 10, 1981

First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;

July 16, 1981

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

August 24, 1982

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

November 20, 1984

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

February 28, 1984

Direct Examination of 2nd Plaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross-examination was waived.

August 21, 1985

Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct examination.

"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered its appearance as new private respondents' counsel after Atty. Gerardo Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:

February 23, 1987

The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.

April 21, 1987

The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.

June 19, 1987

The third amended complaint was admitted.

September 9, 1987

Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants herein petitioners.

October 22, 1987

The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would require the private respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that the land involved in this case was not a part of the public forest.

December 17, 1987

The hearing was postponed at the request of private respondents' counsel for the reason that she would be attending a conference in Cebu City.

March 18, 1988

The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest Development report had not yet been finished.

July 5, 1988

The hearing was reset upon agreement of both counsel.

September 15, 1988

The hearing was reset upon the Court's instance.

December 8, 1988

No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest Development was being awaited.

March 16, 1989

The said certification was still being awaited.

May 25, 1989

The testimony of Private Respondent Pedro Quilat-Quilat was suspended after a question was propounded that would require him to use reading eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.

December 14, 1989

Hearing was reset due to the illness of private respondents' counsel.

September 20, 1990

Atty. Eleccion, petitioners' counsel did not appear despite due notice. At this time, the private respondents rested their case.

October 15, 1990

Atty. Eleccion private respondents' counsel did not appear. Hearing was reset to October 16, 1990.

October 16, 1990

Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing was reset to December 10, 11 and 12.

December 10, 1990

Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing was reset to December 11, 1990.

December 11, 1990

Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case was submitted for decision as of that day.

August 21, 1992

The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by stenographer Alexander Yberley, was missing. He was ordered to produce the transcript.

October 30, 1992

Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-examination since stenographer Yberley manifested that the record was burned. Despite due notice, nobody appeared for the petitioners. So as of this day, the cross-examination of Atilano Ramirez was considered waived and the case was finally submitted for decision.

December 11, 1992

Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case was set for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5, 1993.

March 22, 1993

Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He was advised by the Court to be prepared on the next scheduled hearing.

June 4, 1993

Judge was on leave. Hearing was reset to July 2, 1993.

July 2, 1993

Flaviano Umbac was presented as first petitioners' witness Hearing was scheduled for August 27, 1993.

August 27, 1993

Petitioners moved for a resetting October 7, 1993.

October 7, 1993

Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the petitioners. His testimony was terminated and hearing was reset to December 13, 1993.

December 13, 1993

Judge was on leave. Hearing was reset to February 14, 1994.

February 14, 1994

Hearing was reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who wanted to recall his witness Atty. Bongaciso. Hearing was reset to March 23, 1994.

March 24, 1994

Hearing was postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for settlement.

May 6, 1994

Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the absence of recalled 2nd petitioners' witness Bongaciso, hearing was reset to June 17, 1994.

June 17, 1994

Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He would attend a Kiwanis Training Conference. Hearing was reset to July 4, 1994.

July 4, 1994

Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez was available at 10:00 a.m. so the case was reset to August 15, 1994.

August 15, 1994

Judge was on leave. Hearing was reset to October 3, 1994.

October 3, 1994

The hearing was reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-availability of petitioners' witness Atty. Roque Bongaciso who was on recall.

November 17, 1994

There was talk about a proposed settlement, hearing was held in abeyance.

January 6, 1995

Since no settlement was realized a private respondents' motion to set the case for hearing was filed and the case was reset to February 27, 1995.

February 27, 1995

Earlier, petitioners' counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for postponement as he would be appearing in a case in Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested that on February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that this case had been delayed by the failure of the petitioners to complete the presentation of their evidence. The Court then ordered the case submitted for decision for the THIRD TIME.

March 16, 1995

The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case for the petitioners for June 16, 1995 with a STERN WARNING TO THE PETITIONERS.

June 16, 1995

The hearing set for this day was cancelled as the Judge was on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.

September 8, 1995

The petitioners' counsel did not appear. Hearing was reset to November 16, 1995.

November 16, 1995

The petitioners' counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The hearing was reset to February 13, 1996.

February 9, 1996

The petitioners' counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.

February 12, 1996

The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the petitioners' counsel. The petitioners were directed to immediately engage the services of a new counsel. This notice was received personally by the wife of Petitioner Mauro Edrial, Jr.

February 13, 1996

The Court issued an order setting the case for April 26, 1996. This order was received by the wife of the Petitioner Mauro Edrial, Jr.

April 26, 1996

There was no appearance from the petitioners. Hence, the case was submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.

July 8, 1996

Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered his appearance.

August 20, 1996

Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to motion of the petitioners.

September 6, 1996

The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting the case for decision.

September 11, 1996

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.

October 2, 1996

Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

October 23, 1990

Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they actually deserved.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a reversal thereof would have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their right to due process.

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is without merit.

Main Issue

Due Process and Reopening of Trial

Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of communication he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only after he had filed his withdrawal as their counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private respondents were equally guilty of delay and procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining evidence would be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice."

Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its Order to submit the case for decision; that is, petitioners were given several opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them. Petitioners, they further point out, were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the case because they were in physical possession of the land in dispute.

Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.

True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was submitted for decision three times on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February 27, 1995 but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in court each time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this case.

The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure. The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of substantial justice. We concur with the CA that there is no such denial in this case.

It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent his clients effectively for several years despite allegedly having lost their correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed, it was too late for him to do so after he had withdrawn as their counsel. According to him, after April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify the whereabouts of Mauro Edrial, Jr. The inquiry yielded the information that Mauro actually resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial-Valenzuela resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete City. He should have undertaken the search before withdrawing as counsel. Further, notice might not have been received by petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse counsel's failure to appear during trials. CSEHcT

Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty. Roque Bongaciso because of the latter's prior commitments which conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on file. He should just have adjusted the order of presentation of witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date in his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bongaciso three years.

Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04). EITcaH

For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:

"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 30-40.

2. Rollo, p. 45.

3. Former Special Ninth Division; penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, chairman; with the concurrence of Justices Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, members.

4. CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 40.

5. Presided by Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang.

6. Rollo, pp. 79-84.

7. The case was deemed submitted for decision upon the Court's receipt of the Memorandum for the Respondents on February 22, 2000. Said Memorandum was signed by Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte Felipe of the Public Attorney's Office.

8. Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 22. Petitioners' Memorandum was filed by Sedillo Icao Hernando and Associates, represented by Atty. Eduardo T. Sedillo who failed/neglected to sign it.

9. , 257 SCRA 578, 585, June 26, 1996.

10. , 51 SCRA 424, 424-425, June 28, 1973; ., 52 SCRA 58, 63-64, July 12, 1973.

11. , 299 SCRA 518, 525, December 2, 1998; , 267 SCRA 543, 550, February 6, 1997.

12. Petition, p. 18; rollo, p. 21.

13. ., 258 SCRA 254, 270, July 5, 1996.

14. CA Decision, p. 11; citing Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 123; rollo, p. 40.