EN BANC

G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000.

ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

Antonio F. Navarrete for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City and thereafter assumed office. Subsequently, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the CSC that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner's separation pay under Sec. 11 of i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Sec. 11 of

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7924; METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; SEPARATION PAY UNDER SECTION 11 OF R.A. 7924 SOLELY CONFINED TO SERVICES RENDERED IN THE MMA. In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected. CIAcSa

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE COMPENSATION, CONCEPT; A RETIREE RECEIVING PENSION OR GRATUITY CAN CONTINUE TO RECEIVE IT EVEN IF HE ACCEPTS ANOTHER GOVERNMENT POSITION TO WHICH ANOTHER COMPENSATION IS ATTACHED. The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another government position to which another compensation is attached. Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDITING THE YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE JUDICIARY IN THE COMPUTATION OF SEPARATION PAY UNDER R.A. 7924 AND RECEIVING RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER R.A. NO. 910 CONSTITUTE DOUBLE COMPENSATION. To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C. J p:

In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301, which held that petitioner's separation pay under Section 11 of DIETcC

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On 18 January 1983, petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, and he thereafter assumed office. After the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position.

On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension.

On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted

SECTION 11. Transitory Provisions. To prevent disruption in the delivery of basic urban services pending the full implementation of the MMDA's organizational structure and staffing pattern, all officials and employees of the interim MMA shall continue to exercise their duties and functions and receive their salaries and allowances until they shall have been given notice of change of duties and functions, and of being transferred to another office or position.

xxx xxx xxx

The civil service laws, Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. IcaHTA

On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the implementation of

On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his "voluntary option to be separated from the service" his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to "separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1 ) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the

In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under

On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of petitioner's separation pay must be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No. 92-063, pertinent portions of which read:

The payment of separation/retirement benefits cannot be subject to the prohibition against the sic double compensation in cases when officers and employees who were previously granted said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government Agency or Office. Thus, there is no need for separated employees to refund the separation/retirement benefits they received when subsequently reemployed in another government agency or office.

. . . This being so, while an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same once reemployed in the government service, as aforestated, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said separation/retirement benefits should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement/separation pay to be received by the employee concerned. Moreover, in this instance, the employee concerned has the option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his separation pay received, or not to refund his separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation gratuity for the total amount representing his previous separation/retirement pay received.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC. AIDTHC

On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266 affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and dismissing petitioner's appeal. Citing it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice one under

On 9 June 1998, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 98-1422 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to set aside these Resolutions.

On 19 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, now challenged in this case. It held that the CSC was "correct in dismissing petitioner's appeal from the opinion of Director Acebedo." It ratiocinated as follows:

There is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioner's case. Nevertheless, the Court finds it equitable to deny his claim for payment of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1 ) month's salary for every year of his service in government, that is, inclusive of the number of years he served as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila sic.

Petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay.

Suffice it to state that upon his retirement from his office as a Judge, petitioner has already closed a chapter of his government service. The State has already shown its gratitude for his services when he was paid retirement benefits under sic]. For that is what retirement benefits are for. Rewards are given to an employee who has given up the best years of his life to the service of his country (Gov't. Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179, 188).

Now, the state again wishes to show its gratitude to petitioner by awarding him separation pay for his services as a director of the Metro Manila Authority (MMA), another chapter of petitioner's government service which has come to a close by the reorganization of the MMA into the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. ScaEIT

The Court, in limiting the computation of petitioner's separation pay to the number of years of his service at the MMA, merely is implementing the ruling in "Chavez, Sr. vs. Mathay" (37 SCRA 776), which ruling, if not actually in point, is nevertheless applicable owing to its "common-sense consideration." Said ruling reads:

"The 'common-sense consideration' stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being credited with his years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his second retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account, manifestly govern the case at bar. It is but in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in , affirming Borromeo, that claims for double retirement or pension such as petitioner's, 'would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension.'" (p. 780, italics supplied)

The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about 'double pension.' It is, however, about the interpretation of a gratuity law, viz., Section 11 of

We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner's separation pay under Section 11 of

In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.

Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government service. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11, which pertinently reads:

Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. IDAESH

Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under

The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides:

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.

Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under

However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. Said provision reads:

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law . . .

Section 11 of ISaCTE

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the petition in this case is DENIED for want of merit, and the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, 31-41. Per Barcelona, R., J., with Demetria, D., and Gozo-Dadole, M., JJ., concurring.

2. Not Rollo, 31), or Rollo, 50 and 52).

3. 37 SCRA 776 1971.

4. , 94 Phil. 903 1954; , 94 Phil. 964 1954; , 103 Phil. 515 1958; , 4 SCRA 375 1962; , 16 SCRA 599 1966; , G.R. No. 133132, 25 January 2000.

5. , 23 SCRA 998 1968; , supra.

6. II JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (A Commentary) 341 (1988 ed.).

7. , 97 Phil. 216 1955; , 110 Phil. 1 1960; , 27 SCRA 200 1969; , supra, note 3.