EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238. January 24, 2003.

ENGR. EDGARDO R. TORCENDE, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant Edgardo R. Torcende is the accused in two (2) criminal cases for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed by a certain Judith Duremdes. At the hearing on February 29, 1996, the complainant, accompanied by a representative of his counsel, arrived late for the scheduled hearing. Respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido, the presiding judge, ordered the arrest of the complainant and the cancellation of his bail bond, and ordered his counsel to explain in writing within five (5) days why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court, for failure to personally appear at the hearing. On an urgent motion by the complainant, the respondent judge recalled the warrant of arrest and reinstated the bail bond. At the scheduled hearing on May 9, 1996, complainant again appeared without his counsel. Respondent imposed a fine on counsel for accused and Complainant Torcende was ordered to reimburse the expenses incurred by private complainants in attending the hearings. Complainant filed with the Court an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent judge with serious misconduct, oppression, corruption, and falsification of public document, violation of constitutional rights and arbitrary detention. He further charged respondent with manifest partiality in the discharge of his official functions by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to both the private complainant and the prosecutors, in violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft Law. After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) payable in four (4) monthly installments of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) each for having acted with bias, partiality and grave abuse of discretion in the performance of his functions.

The Supreme Court, however, found respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. According to the Court, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. Respondent ignored the procedure provided by the Rules of Court in commencing proceedings for indirect contempt which is mandatory and considering the fact that proceedings against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature. Respondent's conduct of imposing a fine on counsel for accused as well as the order for him to reimburse the expenses of private complainants are unjust because both accused and his counsel were not given an opportunity to explain their side. Such conduct of respondent is highly improper and only too deserving of reproof. The Court also considered respondent's act of describing complainant and counsel as "unscrupulous," "senile" men whose "perturbed," "phantasmagoric" minds are prone to "hallucinations" and who, as "brazen" liars who "devastatingly" pervert truth, resort to "fiendish ploys" to delay the speedy disposition of the cases filed against them as a damning indictment against his impartiality and objectivity. The Court reminded respondent judge that government service is people-oriented and patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT; RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE GIVEN COMPLAINANT THE SAME MEASURE OF LIBERALITY HE ACCORDED THE PROSECUTION. Admittedly, complainant's motion to postpone trial was filed on the very day of the hearing. The prosecutors, however, had likewise earlier filed urgent motions for postponement on three (3) successive hearings scheduled where they did not appear, which motions for continuance were all granted. These incidents should have been considered by respondent together with the fact that the motion for postponement was the first filed by the accused in court. Fundamental dictates of fairness should have prompted respondent to give complainant the same measure of liberality he accorded the prosecution. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice." When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.

2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT OF SUMMARILY IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON COMPLAINANT AND HIS COUNSEL FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER AND DESERVING OF REPROOF. With regard to the matter of contempt, it must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have time and again been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. In the case at bar, the fine imposed on counsel for complainant as well as the order for him to reimburse the expenses of private complainant are unjust because both he and his counsel were not given an opportunity to explain their side. In short, respondent summarily imposed the sanctions on complainant and counsel. Such conduct of respondent is highly improper and only too deserving of reproof. IHCacT

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT JUDGE DISPLAYED A DEPLORABLE DEFICIENCY IN HIS GRASP OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONTEMPT. The Court has repeatedly impressed on judges that they should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence as well as to regard the study of law as a never ending and ceaseless process. In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. Contempt is defined as "a disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. Section 3, Rule 71, of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the mode of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit: . . . After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel . . . Nazareno v. Barnes interpreted a "written charge" to mean that either: 1.] an order requiring the person to be charged with contempt to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, be issued by the court; or 2.] a petition for contempt by way of a special civil action under Rule 71 be initiated in order for contempt proceedings to prosper: At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The written charge may partake of the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent (not accused) to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed against a court or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer with authority to punish for contemptuous acts. Strict compliance with the afore-cited guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt, as in this case, are commonly treated as criminal in nature. . . . Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.

4. ID.; A JUDGE SHOULD BE THE LAST PERSON TO BE PERCEIVED AS PETTY, SHARP-TONGUED TYRANT HOLDING IMPERIOUS SWAY OVER HIS DOMAIN. The degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his judicial powers was anything but exemplary, especially considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Magistrates have been continuously reminded that . . . the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in on the preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain.

5. ID.; THE ROLE OF A JUDGE MUST BE ONE OF TEMPERANCE, PATIENCE AND COURTESY. The role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals." Describing complainant and counsel as "unscrupulous," "senile" men whose "perturbed," "phantasmagoric" minds are prone to "hallucinations" and who, as "brazen" liars who "devastatingly" pervert truth, resort to "fiendish ploys" to delay the speedy disposition of the cases filed against them is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate.

6. ID.; ID.; JUDGES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE TEMPERATE IN THEIR LANGUAGE REFRAINING FROM INFLAMMATORY OR EXCESSIVE RHETORIC OR FROM RESORTING TO THE LANGUAGE OF VILIFICATION. Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting "to the language of vilification." . . . Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Third, a party-litigant's right to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" has, at best, become an empty and hollow rhetoric. To be sure, branding complainant as a "brazen" liar, an "unscrupulous" and "indiscriminate" issuer of bouncing checks who charges "usurious interest" even before the contending parties have completed their offer of evidence is a damning indictment against his impartiality and objectivity.

7. ID.; A JUDGE'S UNFLATTERING RECORD ERODES THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY. Obviously being chastised twice has not reformed respondent. On the contrary, instead of learning from his past mistakes he persisted in his errant ways. Indeed, it seems that respondent judge has remained undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the Code which he has promised to live by. He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received because the records of the OCA, in fact, discloses that aside from this case, respondent Judge had six (6) other similar administrative complaints still pending against him. Needless to state, such an unflattering record only further erodes the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy. Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct beyond which he may not freely venture. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary. CaDSHE

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM p:

Time and again the Court has reminded all those who don the judicial robe that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Along the same vein, judges are expected to be restrained and sober in their speech. Restraint is, in fact, a trait desirable in those who administer justice. Their language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Intemperate speech detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.

The Court is once again called upon to reiterate these dicta in the instant administrative matter.

Complainant is the accused in two (2) criminal cases for Violation of , docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3422 and 1010, filed by Judith Duremdes. At the time of the filing of the complaints, jurisdiction was vested in the regional trial courts. The accused was arraigned on October 11, 1993 for Criminal Case No. 3422 before Branch 24, and on November 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 1010 before Branch 25, both of the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato. When for failure to personally appear at the hearing. On an urgent motion by the accused, the respondent judge recalled the warrant of arrest and reinstated the bail bond. On March 20, 1996, respondent judge denied the "Motion to Quash."

At the scheduled hearing on May 9, 1996, the accused again appeared without his counsel. He filed an Omnibus Motion to: (a) bar the appearance of a private prosecutor; (b) seek a reconsideration of the order denying the "Motion to Quash"; (c) postpone the proceedings pending resolution of the motions. Respondent denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of notice of hearing and imposed a fine on counsel for accused for failure to appear and for violating the rule on motions. Accused Torcende was also ordered to reimburse the expense incurred by private complainants in attending the hearings.

On May 21, 1996, accused filed with this Court an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent judge with serious misconduct, oppression, corruption, falsification of public document, violation of constitutional rights and arbitrary detention. He further charged respondent with manifest partiality in the discharge of his official functions by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to both the private complainant and the prosecutors, in violation of Section 3 (e) of More specifically, complainant Torcende alleged that respondent did not actually conduct an examination in writing and under oath of the private complainant and witnesses in the course of the preliminary investigation, as required by Rule 112 of the

Respondent was required to file a comment on the complaint. In his Comment, respondent explained that he conducted an examination in writing under oath of complainant and witnesses, as borne out by the written preliminary examination report submitted to the OCA; that Criminal Case No. 3422 was remanded to his court from the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 24 pursuant to

In a Resolution dated December 9, 1998, respondent was required to manifest whether he is submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Thereafter, respondent judge filed a "Compliance" manifesting his conformity to have the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.

After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) payable in four (4) monthly installments of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) each for having acted with bias, partiality and grave abuse of discretion in the performance of his functions. IDcHCS

Before addressing the issue on respondent's administrative culpability, it must be pointed out that he cannot be faulted for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 3422. The said case fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts with the passage of which amended otherwise known as the "

SEC. 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

The records disclose that pursuant to the provisions of the above-cited law, Criminal Case No 3422 was remanded to the sala of respondent by the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 24 in an Order dated October 17, 1994.

The manner in which respondent conducted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3422, however, leaves much to be desired. Indeed, the inordinate haste in which he denied outright the Omnibus Motion of the complainant exposes him to suspicion. In denying complainant's motion, respondent cited the provisions of Rule 15, Section 4 of the

Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant on shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, especially on matters which the court may dispose on its own motion.

The Omnibus Motion filed by complainant sought: l.] to bar the appearance of private prosecutor; 2.] for reconsideration of the court's order of March 20, 1996; and 3.] to postpone the initial hearing of the case set for May 9, 1996. While it was served on the public and private prosecutors on May 9, 1996, the day of the initial hearing itself, previous motions to bar appearance of the private prosecutor and for reconsideration of the March 20, 1996 Order were served thirteen (13) days before the scheduled hearing, which was way beyond the period required by the

Admittedly, complainant's motion to postpone trial was filed on the very day of the hearing. The prosecutors, however, had likewise earlier filed urgent motions for postponement on three (3) successive hearings scheduled where they did not appear, which motions for continuance were all granted. These incidents should have been considered by respondent together with the fact that the motion for postponement was the first filed by the accused in court. Fundamental dictates of fairness should have prompted respondent to give complainant the same measure of liberality he accorded the prosecution.

The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After all, postponements is and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice." When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.

With regard to the matter of contempt, it must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have time and again been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.

In the case at bar, the fine imposed on counsel for complainant as well as the order for him to reimburse the expenses of private complainant are unjust because both he and his counsel were not given an opportunity to explain their side. In short, respondent summarily imposed the sanctions on complainant and counsel. Such conduct of respondent is highly improper and only too deserving of reproof for the following reasons:

First, the Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy. Indeed

A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.

The Court has repeatedly impressed on judges that they should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence as well as to regard the study of law as a never ending and ceaseless process.

In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. Contempt is defined as "a disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71.

There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. Section 3, Rule 71, of the

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an office of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

interpreted a "written charge" to mean that either: 1.] an order requiring the person to be charged with contempt to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, be issued by the court; or 2.] a petition for contempt by way of a special civil action under Rule 71 be initiated in order for contempt proceedings to prosper:

At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rues of Court. The written charge may partake of the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent (not accused) to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed against a court or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer with authority to punish for contemptuous acts.

Strict compliance with the afore-cited guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt, as in this case, are commonly treated as criminal in nature.

. . . Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.

Second, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his judicial powers was anything but exemplary, especially considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Magistrates have been continuously reminded that

. . . the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in on the preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the acts of respondent judge in this case as underscored by the derogatory terms in which he described complainant and counsel in his comment, viz:

1.] On the charge of manifest partiality: "It is purely the product of the senility and ghostly apparitions that symbolizes the phantasmagoric mentality of Torcende and his counsel, and whose perturbed minds had been distorted after numerous cases for Violation of ."

2.] On complainant's claim in paragraph 20 of the affidavit-complaint that they waited more than an hour: "is overwhelmingly a brazen lie and devastatingly a perversion of truth which should be cast into the four winds of heavens that no remembrance thereof maybe (sic) had among men of moral values and sense of fairness. . . . the complainant having the temerity of lying . . ., he and his counsel should be held in contempt of court of the highest order (sic)."

3.] On complainant's counsel's filing of motions: "it is worthwhile mentioning that Atty. Occe a has that perennial habit of filing motions on the very day a case is set for trial but bearing ANTEDATED date to make it appear as having been made in compliance with the 3-day notice required by the."

4.] On complainant's counsel's filing of motions on the day of the hearing: "construed by the court and the prosecution as a feindish (sic) ploy designed to delay further the claims of complainants for the unscrupulous issuances of bouncing checks by Torcende not to mention the fact that his complainants . . . had been complaining of their agony regarding the usurious interest for the money they borrowed to advance in the construction of the housing units constructed by them but was paid later by Torcende with these worthless checks subject matters of the numerous criminal cases for violation ."

5.] On the allegation of complainant that respondent, the prosecutor and the offended parties conspired in violating complainant's constitutional rights: "is but just a figment of Torcende's fructuous creativity and the by-product of his hallucinations. No constitutional right of him (sic) had ever been violated by anyone in the conduct of the numerous criminal cases against him. If by now he greatly suffered the consequences of his very own act, he alone is to be blamed for indiscreminately (sic) issuing numerous worthless checks. Consequently, in so doing, he had caused, and he still is causing, great damage and prejudice to the payee of those checks." (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals." Describing complainant and counsel as "unscrupulous," "senile" men whose "perturbed," "phantasmagoric" minds are prone to "hallucinations" and who, as "brazen" liars who "devastatingly" pervert truth, resort to "fiendish ploys" to delay the speedy disposition of the cases filed against them is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate.

Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting "to the language of vilification."

In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the

Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.

Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.

Third, a party-litigant's right to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" has, at best, become an empty and hollow rhetoric. To be sure, branding complainant as a "brazen" liar, an "unscrupulous" and "indiscriminate" issuer of bouncing checks who charges "usurious interest" even before the contending parties have completed their offer of evidence is a damning indictment against his impartiality and objectivity.

The instant case is not respondent's first offense because he had previously been administratively sanctioned by the Court in the following cases:

1.] , an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct, where respondent judge was ordered to pay fine of Five thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

2.] , an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, where respondent judge was imposed a stiffer fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and sternly warned, considering that this was the second time he was administratively sanctioned, the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service.

Obviously being chastised twice has not reformed respondent. On the contrary, instead of learning from his past mistakes he persisted in his errant ways. Indeed, it seems that respondent judge has remained undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received because the records of the OCA, in fact, discloses that aside from this case, respondent Judge had six (6) other similar administrative complaints still pending against him.

Needless to state, such an unflattering record only further erodes the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.

Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct beyond which he may not freely venture. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, and accordingly orders his DISMISSAL from the service and the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. cDTSHE

Respondent Judge Sardido shall immediately vacate his position as Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, as well as any position in the judiciary to which he may be presently assigned, and desist from deciding or resolving any case or incidents therein upon receipt of the notice.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Canon 1, Rule 1.01,

2. Canon 2, Rule 2.01,

3. ., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708, 23 July 2002, citing Canon 2,

4. , 31 SCRA 237 1971; , 26 SCRA 393 1968.

5. Agpalo R.E. Legal Ethics. 6th Ed. (1997), p. 440, citing , 155 SCRA 72 1987 and , 254 SCRA 286 1996.

6. , 39 SCRA 418 1971

7. Rollo, p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 9.

9. Id., pp. 37 38.

10. Id., p. 39.

11. Id., p. 51.

12. Id., pp. 1 53.

13. Id., p. 55.

14. Id., pp. 56 73.

15. Id., p. 93.

16. Which took effect on April 15, 1994.

17. Rollo, p. 78.

18. Amended by Section 4, Rule 15 of the

SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

19. Rollo, pp. 40 50.

20. ., 234 SCRA 625, 629 1994, citing , 188 SCRA 530 1990.

21. , 255 SCRA 238, 247 1996.

22. 217 SCRA 372, 380 381 1993; , 170 SCRA 745, 749 1989; .

23. ., 275 SCRA 543 1997; , 251 SCRA 174 1995; , 243 SCRA 299 1995.

24. , 338 SCRA 282, 299 2000, citing , 313 SCRA 739 1999, citing , 199 SCRA 238 1991.

25. , 287 SCRA 1, 16 1998.

26. Canon 3, Rule 3.01.

27. ., 271 SCRA 328 1997.

28. , 334 SCRA 1 2000, citing , 291 SCRA 619 1998, citing , 237 SCRA 1 1994, citing , 51 SCRA 78 1973; , 71 SCRA 166 1976; , 99 SCRA 30 1980; , 199 SCRA 48 1991; , 227 SCRA 258 1993; , 226 SCRA 73 1993.

29. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1635, 17 September 2002, citing , 298 SCRA 710 1998; , 313 SCRA 44, 46 1999.

30. , 284 SCRA 144 1998.

31. , 179 SCRA 355 1989.

32. , 252 SCRA 444 1996.

33. 284 SCRA 144 1998, citing , 187 SCRA 75 1990.

34. 136 SCRA 57 1985.

35. ; , 41 Phil. 548 1921.

36. , 268 SCRA 688 1997, citing , 243 SCRA 64 1995.

37. 127 Phil. 716 1967.

38. , 136 SCRA 57 1985; ., 275 SCRA 543 1997.

39. , citing , 20 SCRA 1247 1967; 274 SCRA 10 1997 and ; , 298 SCRA 110 1998.

40. , 116 SCRA 136 1982.

41. , 290 SCRA 44 1998.

42. Rollo, p. 56.

43. Ibid., p. 63.

44. Id.

45. Id., p. 68.

46. Id., p. 72.

47. See , 31 SCRA 237 170; , 104 SCRA 689 1981; , 91 SCRA 416 1979.

48. , 71 SCRA 1 1976.

49. , 33 SCRA 722 1970.

50. , 97 SCRA 483 1980.

51. , p. 6.

52. Ibid., p. 9.

53. , 250 SCRA 1 1995.

54. Pineda E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 354 355 1995.

55. , 348 SCRA 425, 434 2000, citing , 272 SCRA 324 1997.

56. Rollo, p. 63.

57. Ibid., p. 68.

58. Id., p. 72.

59. Id., p. 68.

60. Id.

61. 246 SCRA 94 1995.

62. 281 SCRA 415 1997.

63. A.M. No. MTJ-00-1323, 22 August 2002, citing , 330 SCRA 368 2000.

64. Ibid.; ; .

65. 1.] MTJ-01-1370 (formerly A.M. No. 00-11-238-MTC) for Gross Ignorance of the Law.

2.) 01-1041-MTJ for Violation of

3.] 96-221-MTJ for Misdeed in the performance of duty.

4.] 98-512-MTJ for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment.

5.] 97-414-MTJ for Gross Misconduct; Gross Violation of the

6.] 99-687-MTJ for Grave Abuse of Discretion, Partiality and Ignorance of the Law.

66. , 322 SCRA 255 2000.

67. , 355 SCRA 69, 90 91 2001.